Since 1999, the newly established peacekeeping operations (PKOs) of the United Nations have basically obtained robust mandates, which are mainly due to the changes in the nature of conflicts and peacekeeping environment. In the context of continuous conflicts and “no peace to keep” in the deployed areas, peacekeepers are exposed to various types of asymmetric threats. Since the political process and external support are prone to collapse, PKOs are often difficult to fulfill mandate tasks and even forced to evacuate. Therefore, the UN PKOs suffer setbacks in many countries, such as Angola, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Central Africa and Mali. As a result, these countries are trapped into civil wars again. In the face of major changes in the nature of conflicts and the deployment environment, robust peacekeeping is inevitable.
However, robust mandate makes peacekeeping deviated from the Hammarskjöld Principles (consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate).
First, in order to ensure that PKO missions have sufficient resources and capacity to fulfill the mandate tasks assigned by the Security Council, the rules of engagement have been revised to “non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate”, and a circumstance is added for the use of force in the fulfillment process of the tasks. The revision has two effects: On one hand, the expansion of the mandate task and the broadening of the connotation of mandate fulfillment lower the threshold for the use of force. On the other hand, the peacekeeping forces say goodbye to passive defensive posture and reveal the militarized trend of active offensive, which are especially proved by the action of protecting “civilians exposed to the threat of imminent physical violence”, and the Security Council’s mandates of the Stabilization Missions in Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan.
Second, as a large number of armed groups are rampant within the conflict-stricken countries and the complicated interest appeals are raised, most of the UN policy documents define “Consent” as the consent of the main parties to the conflicts which exclude some factions from consent framework. Robust peacekeeping is designed to treat these armed groups and individuals, which fail to join in the peace process or political process, as an object of isolation and military strike. If there is an effective government, the main party is the host government for sure. However, in many cases (e.g., Sudan and South Sudan), the government's consent is often involuntaryunder the pressure of the international community. In fact, the Sudanese Government always opposes to the United Nations deployment of peacekeeping forces, where both coercion and consent actions are employed in practice.
Third, Principle of Neutrality/Impartiality is considered to furnish an excuse for the inaction of the United Nations. A new benchmark for robust peacekeeping lies in distinguishing between impartiality and neutrality and gradually weakening and abandoning neutrality. Three taboos that Hammarskjöld repeatedly emphasizes—no stance-taking, no coercion and no attempt to influence the local balance of power—implies the minimal use of force and never get involved in local conflicts to the utmost extent. The abandonment of neutrality and the new interpretation of impartiality demonstrate the proactive attitude of Peacekeeping Missions under robust mandate.
The Hammarskjöld Principles are inherently linked, and the violation against principle of non-use of force is bound to shock the foundation of the other two principles. Extended use of force in robust peacekeeping leads to the inability to comply with Principles of Consent and Neutrality/Impartiality in traditional sense.
What is embarrassing, instead of inadequate mandate, ineffective response is the current main problem of PKOs. Peacekeeping Missions’ reluctance to take action due to the following reasons: (1) Excessive expectations of the international community and increasing tasks make it difficult for Peacekeeping Missions to fulfill their mandate tasks. (2) Special composition of the peacekeeping forces gives rise to a chaotic dual command system. (3) Confusion of leadership system prevails in the United Nations in terms of robust peacekeeping, including different understandings of the criteria for the use of force and the absence of a leadership system for coordinated effort and rapid response. Moreover, robust peacekeeping also complicates the peacekeeping operations, expands scale of peacekeeping and causes fold increase in peacekeeping costs. Due to the Missions’ deep involvement in civil conflicts, the status of peacekeeping forces and the nature of peacekeeping operations become complex. As it is difficult to enjoy sustained support from the international community, robust peacekeeping is often an anticlimax and is unlikely to achieve the desired goals.
The United Nations needs to recognize its own capacity limitation. Robust mandate should be confined to the protection of Peacekeeping Missions and civilians under threats. To this end, the overwhelming military forces can be used to respond resolutely. But they should not be used for offensive military operations, such as fight against rebellion, counterterrorism and combating armed factions. For peacekeeping missions that require enforcement and coercive actions, the United Nations should make place for stakeholders, such as regional organizations, blocs and great powers. “Cooperative Peacekeeping” Mode, characterized by “The United Nations + Partnership”, should be adopted, under which stakeholders play the offensive role. Of course, this depends on whether military operations are taken or whether military operations are legitimate. The Security Council must hold the power of decision-making. The mandate of the Security Council and the invitation of host country are the only way to guarantee the legitimacy of military operations.
Rebust of Peacekeeping and Transfomation of the UN Peacekeeping Operations.pdf
