Source:Global Times Published: 2015-10-14 0:23:01
Since September 30, Russia has launched over 100 military operations in Syria. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, these strikes are mainly targeted at the Islamic State (IS) and other extreme groups. For Syria which has been plagued by a devastating civil war of four and a half years, Moscow's military involvement is undoubtedly a new variable to the chaotic country. Russia is strategically motivated to throw a punch at the IS. First of all, Russia has a particular interest in sustaining the Bashar al-Assad regime. Keeping a close eye on the Middle East of all time, Moscow considers itself an important participant in regional affairs. Iran and Syria are two major pivots for Russia to step in the Middle East. The Russia-Syria relationship could be dated back to the regime of Hafez al-Assad. It's foreseeable that, be it pro-Western or fundamentalist, Syria's diplomatic orientation will be detrimental to Russia in a post-Assad era. Therefore, the survival of the pro-Russia Assad government is of great importance as it is directly related to Russia's position and clout in the Middle East. Moscow intends to support the Assad regime and alter the sour battle in Syria by virtue of gaining an advantage in the battlefield. The civil war of Syria from the very beginning has been to some extent a proxy war, with the Assad government backed by Russia and Iran while a slew of opposition parties have been fostered by the US, France and some Gulf states. A four-and-a-half-year wrestling match has locked all sides in a fragile balance. Of all the opposition groups, the IS and other Islamic forces have the greatest combat ability. Therefore, a prerequisite to sustain and consolidate the Assad government is to score a military advantage. Moscow is aiming at achieving peace through military means and gaining bargaining chips through military involvement. Consequences on the battlefield could exert considerable influence on diplomatic negotiations. If Russia could scoop the Syrian opposition, it will undoubtedly win more bargaining chips for Assad and itself, altering the balance of both the war and negotiations toward Assad and itself. In addition, Russia also has the strategic intention to force international cooperation in the name of cracking down on the IS.
The division of the international community toward the IS stems from two prominent features of the terrorist group: terrorism is both a threat to everyone and also the most prominent opposition to Assad. The more successful Russia is in combating the IS, the more it proves the inaction or incompetence of the Western countries particularly the US. This will force the US and other Western countries to take more resolute and effective measures and foster greater military cooperation within the UN. Moreover, dispersing the IS also means relief for the Assad regime. There is also a bigger perspective to interpret Russia's military involvement. The Iran nuclear deal reached in July not only prevents the Middle East situation from worsening, but also offers an opportunity for a diplomatic shift. Iran might seek reconciliation with the US and Europe and is likely to become more cooperative in terms of combating the IS and stabilizing countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. As Iran's traditional ally, Syria's distribution of power and the fate of Assad will be put on the negotiation table and even become bargaining chips. In case of a loosened Iranian stance over the Syria issue, a preemptive action is in the best interests of Russia. Military operations against the IS could also detach Western attention from the Crimea and Ukraine issue. Russia and the West have undergone a dramatically souring relationship due to the Ukraine crisis, and Russia is suffering stringent sanctions imposed by the West. The slumping oil price since the latter half of 2014 has dealt a heavy blow to the Russian economy. Facing unfavorable external relations and economic woes, Moscow has to take the initiative. Whether its actions could save the situation in Syria and help Russia out of the predicament remains to be seen.
The author is an associate professor of the Institute of International Relations at Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. zhjm@sass.org.cn
