1. N. Korea Intentions behind Their Contradictory and Bizarre Behavior (July, 2009-2010)
North Korea has achieved certain goal in the nuclear program after their second nuclear test (technically and politically), so they need to shift its focus to mitigation of the pressure upon them;
They had put aside their unwavering swear of not attending the Six-party talks any more under the pressure from China and the intensified sanctions by many countries since last fall and, the worsening economic situation amidst the monetary reform in the last November, so they reluctantly agreed to come back to Six-party talks if certain conditions are met. As a matter of fact, they regard the talks as meaningless, since they have become a de facto nuclear power and judge the international community sooner or later would recognize its status as they did to India and Pakistan; and they don’t have any interests to sit down with Japan and South Korea for such a goal (a pledge of denuclearization made in the 9.19 Joint Statement in 2005);
The preconditions the North set for the resumption of the 6-party talks are: lifting the sanctions that UN Security Council imposed on them according to the No.1874 Resolution; signing Peace Treaty between the US and North Korea. From those demands, we could see the North just wants to use the talks as a venue for direct talks with the US; and they want to reverse the sequence of denuclearization and the security assurance offered to them. However, they know clearly so long as they reject or delay coming back to 6-party talks, their situation would further deteriorate and the massive assistance from overseas won’t be guaranteed. Therefore, their preconditions are not so rigid, what they need now is some softening stance from the US or some promises for their face-saving. (Actually they were ready for participation the preparation meeting for the 6-party talks in March before Cheonan incident happened)
Kim Jong-Il keeps a balance between the military and the Foreign Ministry on the issues of nuclear program and normal relations with the periphery countries, but the military has a much powerful voice in shaping Kim Jong-Il state strategy, so the regime has no willingness to drop the nuclear program at present, they only want to use the denuclearization as a topic for endless negotiation, for improving their situation and for some rewards from the US, South Korea and Japan;
From last summer, North Korea restless actions were shown widely, which related to their cooperation projects at Kumgang Mount and Kaesong Industrial Complex, as a result, their leader attempted to improve the relations with Washington and Seoul, sending out a series of reconciliatory messages, however it failed to make any substantial concession on several issues, which both the US and South Korea have strong principled position (coming back to Six-party talks, discussing nuclear issue and addressing South Korean POWs in the inter-Korean summit);
In order to effectively press South Korea to resume the official dialogue and economic cooperation projects, North Korea took a psychological warfare against Seoul, including firing artillery in the Yellow Sea in the last December and March;
2. US Position and Tactics
What the US adopts in dealing with the North currently is strategic patience and not dancing with the North’s provocative tune; Obama Administration has drew many lessens from the Bush Administration and is afraid of being cheated again by the NK; they will not take it seriously and react unsophisticatedly towards any of NK new provocative acts. The bottom line of the US is NK must come back to the talks with no precondition and reaffirm the 9.19 Joint Statement in 2005. There almost does exist a consensus among American scholars: there is no possibility NK will forgo the nuclear program.
However, Washington could not completely abandon the talks, which is the only multilateral channel that could influence NK and continue the process of denuclearization in form, if not in essence, and prevent from NK further damaging the nuclear balance in the Northeast Asia.
Obama Administration and his security team perhaps hold a hidden expectation that NK might have to bow down to the sanctions and PSI pressure, and make some kind of concession for the sake of regime survival. If North Korea returns to the negotiation table, US will adopt a more rigid and clear-cut approach towards NK for the process of denuclearization, CVID or Lee Myung-bak’s Grand Bargain Plan will be main approach. Otherwise, the US has to wait for NK new leadership succession.
The dilemma is there: it seems at present the US has obtained the upper hand of the Washington-Pyongyang game, turning down the NK demand for direct talks and negotiation for the peace treaty, which makes NK nothing to gain. However, as the stalemate prolongs, NK probably would own more nuclear heads and may make substantive progress in the miniaturization of its warheads. As a result, the nuclearization momentum will be almost irreversible.
3. The Sinking of the South Korean Warship Cheonan and Its Impact on Inter-Korean Relations
Due to the Cheonan incident, the tension on the Peninsula has risen into a high point, which could lead to the over-reaction from both sides. South Korea government claimed, which is based on their investigation, North Korea was responsible for the sinking of the warship Cheonan in March, which led to 46 sailors death. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has vowed stern action against the culprits. Now the public shifts its focus on the US-South Korean aftermath counter-measures to the North Korea. One of the probable options is to raise the issue at the UN Security Council. Since NK at its highest level still denied any responsibility involving in this attack incident, it would be very difficult for the five veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council to unanimously support a condemning resolution.
Although all kinds of options, including military retaliation, are on the table, it is almost impossible for South Korea to adopt a military action since the US would not give the nod to such a crisis escalation. As for other options, like anti-submarines joint exercise; resume psychology propaganda against NK; forbid NK ships to pass Jeju Island Strait, cut imports of North Korean commodities, particularly fish products, are all within the bounds of manageable reaction. However, it would definitely ratchet up tension on the peninsula to a certain extent, and it is not unlikely that South and North Korea warships could engage in another skirmish or conflict at Yellow Sea near the Northern Limited Line.
Against this hostility background and South Korea policy “first resolving Cheonan incident and second holding 6-Parth talks,” it will be very difficult to resume the 6-Parth talks in the near future. In order to defy the pressure from the US-South Korea, NK may conduct third round of nuclear test and launch more missiles at sea (including long range missile).
So the Cheonan incident has become a new obstacle for stability of Korean Peninsula and resumption of 6-Parth talks. Both China and the US should play a constructive role to solve this unexpected crisis and urge two Koreas to restrain their overreaction and miscalculation actions. More importantly, we need to prevent such kind of disaster from occurring again and maintain the stability situation on the Peninsula. In order to solve this problem, we need to put all the scientific evidences on the table and talk directly with the North. Giving NK a chance to make explanations and letting international experts to fully examine the evidence in front of the neutral judges are the important step.
